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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This
pursuant

appeal
to

is

from

a bench

a

final [Judgment

trial held

on June

entered

22, 1990.

Judgment was entered on July 25, 1990. The Utah Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate tfye appeal pursuant
to U.C.A., §78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Does

§57-1-32, U.C.A.

appj.y to

Associates

Financial Services as a non-foreclosing] junior lienholder
when Associates bid at the foreclosure Isale of the senior
1

lienor, but was redeemed out of the property prior to
commencement of the lawsuit?
Since this matter was heard as a bench trial (see
Appendix "C") and not as a summary judgment, the standard
for review of the evidence is to be in a light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the bench trial.
There is to be no reversal of the decision of the trial
court on the facts, only if there was an error of law.
Charlton v. Hackett. 11 Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961);
Briaham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 24 Ut.2d
292 (1970) . Since the appeal presents only questions of
law, the court should review the trial court's rulings
for correctness and accord no particular deference to the
appellant.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 752 P.2d 585 (Ut 1988).
2.

Should the fair market value of real estate

sold at a foreclosure sale on a senior lien be examined
pursuant to

§57-1-32, U.C.A. under a non-deficiency

action taken by Associates Financial Services, the junior
lienor, when Associates was not the title holder to the
real estate at the time of the commencement of the action
for collection of the balance due under its note?
2

The standard for review of the evidence is to be in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the
trial court. The decision of the trial court should not
be reversed unless there is an error of [Law. Charlton v.
Hackett. supra; Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, Isupra. The legal
conclusions of the trial court should be reviewed for
correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply vJ Salt Lake City

Corp., supra.
3.

As

a

purchasing

junior

lienor

at

the

foreclosure sale of a senior lien, is Associates barred
from action against appellants pursuant to §78-37-1,
U.C.A. when Associates was redeemed out of the property
prior to the commencement of the lawsujit?
The standard for review of the evidence is to be in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the
trial court. The decision of the tria^. court should not
be reversed unless there is an error of law. Charlton v.
Hackett, supra; Moon Lake Elec. Assfn, supra. The legal'
conclusions of the trial court shoultf
correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply v\.

Corp.f supra.

3

be reviewed

for

Salt Lake City

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
U.C.A., §57-1-32
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust
deed, the amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold* The court
may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property
as of the date of the sale. In any action
brought under this section, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to collect its costs
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in
bringing an action under this section.
U.C.A., §78-37-1
There can be one action for the recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provision of this chapter. Judgment shall be
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and
disbursements, and the sale of mortgage
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same
according to the provisions of law relating to
sales on execution, and a special execution or
4

order of
purpose.

sale

shall

be

issued

for

that

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This c^se is an appeal by appellants, Franklin L.
Slaugh and Cheryl D. Slaugh from a final judgment entered
pursuant to a bench trial held on Jui}e 22, 1990.

The

parties stipulated to the facts of th£ case and agreed
that the matter could be tried on the basis of oral
arguments of counsel only.

R.147.

Tl^e court, pursuant

to the bench trial, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Order and Ju4gment. R.152-158.
The defendants did not object to the tfacts set forth in
the Findings of Fact which had been stipulated to at the
bench trial. The Judgment against defendants is for the
sum of $26,089.71, together with interest in the sum of
$3,848.13 and

for attorney's fees in the amount of

$3,000.00, for a total judgment of |$32,935.84, which
judgment shall bear interest at the ratje of 18% per annum
from and after July 25, 1990. (See Appendix "A").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are set forth ifi the Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law (which had been stipulated
5

to at the bench trial of June 22, 1990) are as follows:
R. 147, 152-155.
1.

Defendants,

Franklin

and

Cheryl

Slaugh

(Slaughs), entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiff,
Associates Financial Services (Associates), on or about
November 26, 1982.
2.

The loan agreement included a note in the

amount of $33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in
the Note.
3.

The note was secured by a trust deed on real

property located at 8 62 0 South Gladiator Way, Sandy,
Utah.
4.

The lien of Associates was a second mortgage* on

the property.
5*

The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage

Loan Corporation (Utah Mortgage).
6.

Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into

default on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go
into default on the Associates trust deed.
7.
commenced

Because
a

of

Slaughs

non-judicial

default, Utah

foreclosure

and

Mortgage

eventually

conducted a trustee's sale on the real property.
6

"I'lie trustee's sale occurred1 on February 28,

M,
,1989

is,snc i ates appeared at the sale land bid an amount

of $26,000,00 as the high bid

Tlho amour

ow i»»'i ty. iitah

Mortgage was approximately $20,000.00 at the time of the
sale""- ~ -—"»--- of thr real property at the time ot
sale wcio lUw-

*-

c

although the exact market

value has n„ \ - 10.

>.<i

At the time of * t* *orecl >su£e sale there were

- * ^->' •! £" J*= - i
also i;e:,b
11.

*-av l1^"? a a u n o t Slaaghs which were

cne rea. es* ite.

The branch manager of Associates, who attended

t. -

actual]

lien**

j.inougb tne>

12.

ncv • - -UC the federal tax
: recor.;.

•.• sociates'

f i In , n -. ldjgiv* was

In Dallas,

* ile dicJ ~ -<=-

Tex-

* - —

of a t, *. tt= report tuat identniea \,.o reaer...
13
c
p^ace.

-

Under federal law, the IRS has a 12 c-day right
J

nb c; * c:_- .,

ru:"*:e
.

;

5

-

when •» ' «r ' - xn
^

; ;ah+" nr .caempiion.

the IPS paid Associates tht- sum of $26,0C
d* '
7

- within 1 20-

14. -The IRS took title to the real property under
the redemption and wiped out any interest of Associates
in the property.

The net proceeds of the redemption to

Associates was approximately $5,700.00, which amount was
applied to the account of Slaughs to reduce the balance
owing.
15.

The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after

redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with
interest from September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the
Note.
16.

No payments have been made by

Slaughs to

Associates since the redemption by the IRS.
17.

The Note provided for an award of attorney's

fees in the event it is necessary to enforce collection
of the Note.
(See Appendix

lf fl

B

for the stipulated Findings of

Fact.)
Based upon the foregoing stipulated facts, Appellee
disputes the following statement of fact found at pages
4 and 5 of the Appellants1 Brief:
It was stipulated

that the value of

the real

property at the time of sale was more than $4 0,000.00,
8

although the exact market value had not teen established.
Therefore, the representa*- ^ of appellants In paragraph
"(e)"

as to a spec 1 tic

amount

owing

to

.

. L^- • -

Associate

•

" • •• time

of

i

sale

is

'• *ppr . :.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ince
1

Associate?

Financial

Services

was

a
/

-"

i* is no* cjoverned toy the deficiency -iet \ q statute, ^5 *5„

' •'

purchased

ine

the

property

redeemed out. by the
s I nce

t:!") e

distinction

iav.c

-ociates
at

sale^

•

•

t-r

LRS(|I does nol' change this effect

pP ri i n en t
between

the

originally

a

po r 1" i on s

purchasing

of

or

»

§ 5 7 -1 - 3 2

majve

nonpurchasing

junior 1ienor,

§57-1-32

\ *. A

junior 1 ienor

HI

does

ny'

app„.y

s

.o

the fair mar<et provisions of that statute

note ^^ea ^r e, *. , the ^a ~d

JUL,IJ.

i iei oi *

^erurity was lost bv reaso
the appe . . .-

unfv. reclosmo

asocial-

•'. .

-* f defaults cf

no

loss of the security.

There was also no breach of any

duty by Associates, Therefore, the One-Action Rule does
not apply to this action.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS ACTION IS NOT GOVERNED BY §57-1-32
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SINCE THIS IS NOT AN
ACTION FOR A DEFICIENCY.
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234
(Utah 1991) is controlling on the interpretation of §571-32, U.C.A.

The court, in recognizing that the 3-month

rule did not apply to a non-foreclosing junior lien
holder, stated the following:
We have not heretofore had occasion to
determine whether the fair market value
limitation of section 57-1-32 applies to a
"sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor."
However, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a
recent decision, declined to apply the threemonth limitation contained in section 57-1-3 2
to a nonforeclosing junior.
G. Adams Ltd.
Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) .
The court reasoned that the
statute only applied to a creditor who had
foreclosed. Since the second lienor had not
foreclosed, section 57-1-32 did not apply.
Id. at 963.
Consistent with this ruling, we hold that
since City, a sold-out junior, is unsecured,
it is not pursuing a "deficiency judgment"
and, therefore, the statute would not apply.
10

As a result, City Is not 1 imited'by the fair
market value provision of section |57-l-3 2 from
pursuing
its
claim, •• against
the
debtor
personally. Id. at 239
The

:y Consumer

define-

Services

, .

forec- -

*

case

^sc

*v

"

"creditor originally secured
.J property

v . Peters

b\ ^ seou.-d

Lien against

but nnqpcur^d as * r-su t. of tne senior's
Id.

lien position tr tr^r

. ta

i :

k,i.;J,

ta,,

taa'tn T'rrpleted * "irerlosure which pxtinquishea trr-

^unior lienor*1,

r,s *:;*-*• definition ot -»
d %-l-*.
^

*• - .

:

-~ iir'-r

A-

\?*cc,i+,c:s \*a& -r-4- pursuing a

ic^eiicy ;uug..v. * v. ^1,^1. :,.a^;.- and

m t : ..fore,

§57-1-32 would net ,u.*oly.
The -

* * —.

^ e property nt -.ne sc^e, <«* was .ater redee^ec ^ .. • .
the IPS 1o^^ -jf ^ chanqe this pffec
p

s'n, e the pertinent

"

purchasing

onpurchasing

states Lxie loilowing:

J 1

*un

-r lienor.

§57-.-.,.

At any time within three months after any sale
of property under a trust deed as hereinafter
provided, an action may be commenced to
recover the balance due on the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security and
in such action the complaint shall set forth
the entire amount of the indebtedness which
was secured by such trust deed . . . (emphasis
added).
The language of the code clearly does not apply to a lien
holder other than the one who has foreclosed its interest
in the property.
The appellant has cited and relied heavily on the
reasoning of the case of Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick,
215 Cal. 3d 941, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. App. , 2 Dist.,
1989) . However, this case is not controlling since the
City Consumer v. Peters case has interpreted the lav; for
Utah.

But, the Citrus State Bank case follows the same

reasoning as the City Consumer case.

The court stated:

Thus a sold out junior lienor whose interest
is lost by virtue of a senior foreclosure is
free to sue directly on his unpaid and now
unsecured note and is not encumbered by the
provisions of section 580(a).
That is, the
amount of the deficiency is not limited.
There is no need to obtain a fair market
appraisal of the secured property and it is
not necessary that an action be commenced
within three months of the foreclosure sale.
Id. at 784.

12

It is true that the Citrus State Bank case holds
that the purchase of the secured property by a junior
lienor caused the junior lienor to be governed by the
deficiency action rule.

This is because the court

reasoned that a purchaser should not gain the advantage
of receiving the security and also have the right to take
an action for the balance unless the deficiency action
rule applies.

However, the Citrus State Bank situation

does not correspond to our case.

Associates did not

receive the property and also bring an action for a
deficiency.

Prior to the commencement of the action,

Associates was redeemed out of the property by the IRS
and was left with only a partial payment toward the debt.
R.154.
A redemption, by definition, is lfa repurchase;
a buying back... The process of annulling and revoking a
conditional sale of property, by performance of the
conditions on which it was stipulated to be revoked."
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (19?9) . Thus by the
redemption, the act of bidding at the sale by Associates
was cancelled out, annulled and revoked.

13

The effect is

as though the IRS made the high bid at sale in the amount
of $26,000.00.
II.
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS
ACTION AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE
LIMITED THROUGH ANY EXAMINATION REGARDING
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
The

appellants,

throughout

their

brief,

have

referred to and relied upon an analysis of the value of
the property. It is clear that the value of the property
was not an issue at the trial since the value was not
finally established as part of the stipulated facts.
R.153.

It should also be noted that the timing of a

right of redemption of the IRS is not consistent with the
three month limitation for a deficiency action. The IRS
has 120-days to redeem and the rule of §57-1-32 only
provides for three months to take action.

Therefore,

under the appellants1 reasoning, a junior, lienholder who
might opt for retention of property in lieu of a lawsuit
would be left without a right of action if a redemption
occurs more than 90 days but less than 12 0 days after the
sale.
14

Since

fair

etaLdbl

market

-a,.if

w-is

"

neither

finally

-

^e

trial court an<i since Associates qxi-jiiiitrs as ci sui i out
iunior

lienor

also do

'

property.

the fair n**rket -^ visions ~* §5*?-;-32

j-pi;

ir A t c

. n »H r.«

~ u;

**

• ne

There simply is no risk * hat Associates would
"~ - - #-a7 **

opportunity

)S w e n

d^

^n

,*~ .. ncienc> necanse of - e

A^dii, n

prior rviemnt>^
-.+ • x Con sumer S e rv ices

~-

deficiency action , , r.ot r^ruired under
55^-1-^

then *-**» »f=>ir w a ^ K e t valv^" provisions of §57-

* -roperly requested *..* examination of the fair market
value of the real estate.
III.
'
" E "ONE ACTION RULE" DOES NOT BAH
APPELLEE FROM RECOVERY OF THE AMOUNT:,
DUE UNDER ITS NOTE,
.i , . -prerne, wwui'; made . . abundantly clear that
- Action
Annotated

-

-

Rule*1

as

es* iblished

~ ;,--- -

the security has oeen . • ->

.=: r-"

y Utah

, -stances where

, _s vdxucl^oo.
15

Code

Cache Valley

Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 618 P.2d 43, 45
(Utah 1980) and Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty Inc.,
657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).

In the case of Utah Mortgage

& Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980) the
Court stated, in speaking of the "One Action Rule1", as
follows:
When the security has been lost or disposed of
without any fault or blameworthy conduct on
the part of the creditor. . .an action may be
brought on the note without going through a
fruitless procedure of foreclosure on nonexistent security.
In the case now before this court, an action in
foreclosure would be fruitless since Associates has
already lost its security on the property through the
nonjudicial foreclosure by the senior lienor. Appellants
are trying to shift their blameworthy conduct and burdens
to the appellee. The existence of the federal tax liens,
under which redemption occurred, was a result of a
failure on the part of the Slaughs —
taxes.

the failure to pay

Slaughs were also in default under the first

trust deed on the property. That default resulted in the
foreclosure.

Associates had nothing to do with the

defaults and tax delinquency of Slaughs.
16

The U S

District Or- •*•

First ! Security Bank of

Utah, N A, v. E elger,

)

stated:
The cour b
- found that a creditor is
precluded from seeking a defi c:i ency only where
the creditor's negligence, or illegal conduct,
has resulted in the loss of the collateral, or
where the •creditor voluntarily released the
junior lien, (emphasis a d d e d ) .
The appellants have not asserted that Associates engaged
j i 1 ax i] ::! Il 3 ega ] uondi ic: "t

They do c 1 a i in, that Associates

; i as negligent.
In order for a claim, of negligence to appl y, there
Binst 11 ::: = a ::i'i i t::;; , ::: :!!: c: :ai: «=
(U t a h

II 9 8 5) •

S ince

t 1ill jams v , I leH: > , • 59 9 I >" 2 1 7 9 3

t::l I = f i r s t

e s s ent i a 1 el emen t

of

i legl igence i s a duty of reasonable care by a defendant to
t\ p.I a i n t :i f £ , i 1: ::i s i lecessar ;y for ap |; el ] ai i ts t ::: se t: for th
a leg a] standard for the duty they C/aim Associates owed.
Associates

"

a

foreclosure Sdic, Associates owed ;,o dat> at tne tiiucr ":
bidding to bic an amount taat approximated the value et
the proper
determine tndt i..fr .*?~*^ ».
not have been higher.

, amouj

^ t t * oy t.iti IkS ^av

Arguably , if Associates had not

bid $26,000, the judgment which has now been entered
against

the

Slaughs

would

be

for

a

higher

sum.

Therefore, Slaughs obtained the benefit by the bidding.
The facts show that the security was lost because
the Slaughs failed to keep the first note and trust deed
current.

No matter what happened at the sale, the

security would have been lost.

Whether Associates bid

higher, or not at all, the sale still would have been
concluded.

Therefore, the security was not lost because

of any conduct of Associates.

It was lost because the

Slaughs allowed the default and incurred the liability
for federal tax liens. It is rather impertinent now for
the Slaughs to claim that the loss of the security
occurred as a result of some breach of an unknown duty by
Associates.
The City Consumer Services case also makes it clear
that the "One Action Rule" does not apply to a "sold out
junior lienor."

This court stated:

Our Cache Valley decision, that the one-action
rule does not apply to a "sold out junior," is
consistent with the purpose of the one-action
rule to bar multiple suits against a debtor
who has defaulted.
It is well established
that statutes should be construed and applied
in accordance with their legislative purpose.
18

Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). As
a result, we hold today that the one-action
rule does not apply to the facts of this case
to deny the junior lienor its right to
recover. The purpose of the one-action rule
is to regulate the procedure of recovery of a
secured creditor, not to deny the creditor's
contract right to recover on its loan.
Therefore, when a junior becomes unsecured due
to foreclosure by the senior lienor, the
junior is not barred bv the one-action rule
from proceeding against the debtor on the
note. since the creditor's status as to
security is determined at the timq the suit is
brought, (emphasis added). Id. ajb 237.
At the time the suit was brought in this action, the
property had been redeemed by the II^S.
foreclosed

and

lost

through

a

It had been

foreclosure

by

Utah

Mortgage, not Associates, and was not controlled or owned
by Associates.
Associates can not be chargeable with fault in
receiving the redemption price paid by the IRS.

Title

28, U.S.C, §2410(d) reads as follows:
In any case in which the United States redeems
real property under this section or section
7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the
amount to be paid for such property shall be
the sum of —
(1) the actual amount paid bv the purchaser
at such sale (which, in the case of a
purchaser who is the holder of th£ lien being
19

foreclosed, shall include the amount of the
obligation secured by such lien to the extent
satisfied by reason of such sale),
(2)
interest on the amount paid (as
determined under paragraph (1) at 6 per cent
per annum from the date of such sale, and
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess
of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in
connection with such property, over (B) the
income from such property plus (to the extent
such property is used by the purchaser) a
reasonable rental value of such property.
(emphasis Added).
There is nothing in the language of §2410(d) that makes
it clear that Associates was entitled to any amount over
and above the redemption paid of $26,000.00, plus 6%
interest.
It is hereby acknowledged by appellant that the Bank
of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981)
has interpreted §2410(d)(1) differently than the strict
construction of the language of §2410(d) would suggest.
Therefore, it appears that Associates may have been able
to demand a higher redemption amount than the IRS paid.
However, it does not necessarily follow that Associates
must seek the highest possible redemption price from the
IRS in the event of a redemption.
20

Again, this would

impose a duty upon Associates which does not exist at
law.

Associates acted reasonably in tjie receipt of the

redemption price paid and should not bd required to have
sued the IRS in order to receive a higher payment just in
order to reduce the claim under the note signed by the
Slaughs.
If Associates were bound by the ff|one Action Rule",
it would lead to a senseless, fruitless, and redundant
trustee's sale on the property which has already been
foreclosed

and

lost to the IRS through redemption.

Associates would record a notice of default and conduct
a foreclosure sale under which it would bid zero.

The

parties would then be back in court to claim a deficiency
for the same amounts which are set forth in the judgment
that was already entered.

This is alp. the more reason

not to create a new duty of care on a junior lienor
during the bidding process at the sale of a senior lien.
CONCLUSION
As a "sold out junior lienor", Associates is not
bound by the deficiency action rule o^ §57-1-32, U.C.A.
The fact that Associates purchased at the sale and was

21

later redeemed out of the property should not create a
new exception to the general rule, especially when the
IRS redemptions occur after the expiration of three
months and prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.
No duty of care exists for a junior lien holder at
the foreclosure sale of a senior lien, because the sale
of the senior lien will extinguish the other liens on the
property, no matter what a junior lienor does.

The

Slaughs had the duty of care to protect the property from
foreclosure so that the lien of Associates would not be
extinguished.

The Slaughs1 breach of their duty of care

should not be ignored or shifted to a party that was not
foreclosing
Associates

the
may

trust
have

deed.

been

able

The

mere

fact

to

obtain

a

that

higher

redemption through the IRS or through the bidding on the
property and subsequent sale thereof, does not constitute
negligence or fault within the meaning of §78-37-1,
U.C.A.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March,

«AN7W. CANNON
At-^oimey for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE!
I do hereby declare that I caiised to be mailed,
postage prepaid, four (4) copies of Appellee's Brief to
the following on the ^Ql

day of March, 1992:

Franklin L. Slaugh, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84094
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BRYAN W. CANNON
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
40 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

JUL 2 5 1990
1

L«m,iy Cler«

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,

1-9,1 -<io-%na^

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for oral argument before
the above entitled Court on June 22, 1990 before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno.

The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff is hereby
granted judgment against defendants as follows:
1.

For Judgment in the principal sum of $2 6,087.71,

together with interest in the sum of $3,848.13.
2.

For a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of

$3,000.00.

APPENDIX "A"

The total Judgment of $32,935.84 shall bear interest .at
the rate of 18% until paid in fullv
DATED this QT

tef 1990.
day of jJoaeJ

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

003S8

Tr..ro JuciiCiAi C'stnct

BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
40 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

JUL 1 5 1990
- % •

Ww^U./ \*l&tK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for oral
argument on the 22nd day of June, 1990, before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno at the hour of 9:00 A.M.

Bryan W. Cannon appeared

for the plaintiff, and Franklin L. Slaugh appeared pro se and as
attorney for Cheryl D. Slaugh. Based upon the stipulations of fact
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh (Slaughs),

entered into a loan agreement with plaintiff, Associates Financial
1

Services (Associates), on or about November 26, 1982.
2.

The loan agreement included a note in the amount of

$33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in the Note.
3.

The note was secured by a trust deed on real

property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, Utah.
4.

The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on the

5.

The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage Loan

property.

Corporation (Utah Mortgage).
6.

Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into default

on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go into default on the
Associates trust deed.
7.

Because of Slaughs1 default, Utah Mortgage commenced

a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually conducted a trustee's
sale on the real property.
8.

The trustee's sale occurred on February 28, 1989.

Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount of $26,000.00 as
the high bid.

The amount owing to Utah Mortgage was approximately

$20,000.00 at the time of the sale.
9.

The value of the real property at the time of sale

was more than $40,000.00, although the exapt market value has not
been established.

2

10.

At the time of the foreclosure sale there were

unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were also liens
on the real estate.
11.

The branch manager of Associates, who attended the

sale, did not actually know about the federal tax liens, although
they were of record.
12.

Associates' file on Slaughs was in Dallas, Texas at

the time of the sale.

The file did have a copy of a title report

that identified the federal tax liens.
13.

Under federal law, the IRS has a 120-day right of

redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in place.

As a

result of the 120 day right of redemption, the IRS paid Associates
the sum of $26,000.00 within 120-days of the sale to cover the high
bid at sale.
14.

The IRS took title to the real property under the

redemption

and wiped

out

any

interest

of

Associates

in the

property.

The net proceeds of the redemption to Associates was

approximately $5,700.00, which amount was applied to the account
of Slaughs to reduce the balance owing.
15.

The balance

of the Note and Trust Deed, after

redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest from
September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the note.

3
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16.

No payments have been made by Slaughs to Associates

since the redemption by the IRS.
17.

The Note provides for an award of attorney1s fees

in the event it is necessary to enforce collection of the Note.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Associates, as a junior lien purchaser at the sale

of a senior trust deed is not bound by the Section 57-1-32, Utah
Code Annotated, 3-month right of action rulp when the IRS exercises
a 120-day right of redemption.
2.

Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated ("One-Action-

Rule") did not require Associates to first conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure before bringing its action for the balance of its debt,
since the security was lost, not through the fault of Associates,
but because of failures by Slaughs.
3.

Plaintiff, Associates, is entitled to a Judgment

against Slaughs in the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest
from and after September of 1989 pursuant to the terms of the Note
and for a reasonable attorney's fee for prosecution of this action.
DATED this <2~*

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURll:

^^x^^^-^-^e^^ ^

^yOof^t^

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

4

00

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this

^-7

day of

July, 1990, to the following:
Franklin L. Slaugh, Esq.
Pro Se and as
Attorney for Cheryl Slaugh
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84092

y/y?^

rrijj/ir^

_
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES,
a corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

890906166

Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,
Defendants.

This

matter

June, 1990.
that

the

came

on

for

bench

The parties stipulated

to

trial on the 22nd day of
the

facts

and

agreed

case could be tried based on opal argument of counsel

only.

After argument of counsel,

under

advisement.

The

the

Court

took

the

matter

Court now being fully advised and good

cause appearing therefore, rules as follows.
Plaintiff

is entitled to Judgment against the defendants in

the sum of $26,089.71
1989

pursuant

to

together
terms

with

of

the

interest
note,

from

minus

any

September
offsets

defendants can legally assert.
The

Court agrees with plaintiff's contention that since the

IRS became the purchaser

of

the

property

from

the

closure,

ASSOCIATES V. SLAUGH

Associates

should

PAGE TWO

not

be

bound

by

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the three month right of

action rule, nor should Associates be required to first
a

non-judicial

foreclosure

before

bringing an action for the

balance of its debt, since the security was
the

fault

of

Associates,

but

conduct

lost,

because

of

not

through

failures

defendants.
Plaintiff is to prepare the Order.
Dated this^X&) day of July, 1990.

J
RAYMONti S. UNO C
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

by
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ASSOCIATES V. SLAUGH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true
of

the

foregoing

Memorandum

this ^£(_dav of July, 1990:

Bryan W. Cannon
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 E. South Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin L. Slaugh
Pro se
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84094

Decision,

and

correct

copy

to the following,

